The expert elections*2025 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the "Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections" campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.
CONCLUSIONS
The seventh presidential election* in Belarus took place against the backdrop of a deep human rights crisis caused by the repression that followed peaceful protests against fraud in the previous presidential election. The authorities continue to arbitrarily persecute candidates, members of election teams and initiative groups, observers, activists and simply caring citizens who signed their names for the nomination of independent candidates in the previous presidential elections in 2020. Scheduling the elections for January 26, 2025, 6 months before the expected date (and 7 days before the deadline for registration of initiative groups to nominate presidential candidates), indicates the instrumentalization of electoral procedures and manipulation of legislation. In essence, the authorities adjusted the election date to political objectives, thereby violating electoral legislation in terms of equality of opportunity for candidates and the principle of election predictability provided for by international electoral standards.
The monitoring of all stages of the election campaign conducted by the "Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections" campaign allows us to conclude that the presidential elections* did not meet international standards for democratic and free elections, and were accompanied by numerous violations of the electoral legislation of the Republic of Belarus. All stages of the electoral process were not just administratively controlled by the authorities but were organized by them to keep Aliaksandr Lukashenka in power while imitating his broad popular support. This is evidenced by:
- the complete suppression of the right to freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, and other human rights, without which it is impossible to speak about free and democratic elections;
- opaque formation of election commissions;
- candidates approved by the authorities, who did not base their election programs on criticism of A. Lukashenka's policies but on the full support of him (with the exception of A. Kanapatskaya);
- collection of signatures aimed at creating the appearance of support only for A. Lukashenko (it was declared that the signatures of more than a third of all voters had been collected), using administrative resources and coercion, since the lists are open and refusal to sign could become the basis for political persecution;
- campaigning which rendered all candidates except A. Lukashenka practically invisible in the information space, and in support of A. Lukashenka, administrative and propaganda resources were used to simulate political activity and broad support, which can basically be called servicing the cult of A. Lukashenka;
- continuation of the practice of forcing voters to participate in early voting;
- a climate of intimidation with bans on photographing and taking out ballots, and several police officers on duty at all polling stations;
- opaque vote counting procedure;
- the reported record turnout figures (85.7%), including in early voting (41.81%), exceed the 2020 figures (84.38% and 41.70%, respectively), when the level of politicization and mobilization of society was significantly higher, which was evident from the queues at polling stations on election day;
- complete absence of independent observers.
It is impossible to conduct a free and open election campaign in a situation of ongoing political terror: the list of political prisoners is updated weekly and there are more than 1,200 people in it. The information space has been completely purged; almost all independent media outlets have been driven out of the country, and the dissemination of their materials from abroad is significantly hampered by the politically motivated abuse of anti-extremist legislation. The "state ideology" serves the cult of the authoritarian rule of A. Lukashenka. There is no recognition of the importance of political pluralism in the public field. Virtually all opposition political parties and political public organizations have been liquidated, and their leaders and many activists have been imprisoned or forced to leave Belarus due to the threat of arbitrary, politically motivated persecution. The repressive pressure on civil society organizations, especially human rights organizations, and their mass liquidation exclude civilian control over the conduct of elections. There is no independent civic monitoring of the elections within the country; only politically biased international observers are invited.
Election commissions
- The general conditions and the actual procedure of the formation of territorial and precinct election commissions (TECs and PECs), which are an important mechanism of the electoral process, demonstrate the state dirigisme of all electoral processes with the imitation of the active participation of civil society, which gave the current executive power full control over the formed commissions.
- The formation of TECs and PECs took place in conditions when among the two main actors of civil society — political parties and other public associations — there were no organizations that could show independent initiative. The "labor collectives" inherited from the Soviet times are not political subjects, and the electoral processes on their behalf are organized by administrative methods. Citizens, who have the right to participate in the formation of territorial election commissions, are intimidated by the general atmosphere of terror; those who have been active in previous election cycles are subjected to preventive repression.
- The possibilities of public control and independent observation of the process of formation of the TECs and PECs are not only reduced to zero, but they are persecuted activities.
- In favor of the top-downmanagement of the whole process spoke also the general rush: 1,725 people were allegedly nominated by parties, public associations, labor collectives, and citizens in just one week in the number necessary to form virtually all TECs with the maximum number of members.
- A total of 5,325 PECs were formed (86 fewer than on a single voting day in 2024, and 398 fewer than in the 2020 presidential election (data excluding polling stations abroad in 2020)). They included 56,550 persons. A reduction in the number of PECs with a slight increase in the average number of commission members means that small polling stations have been eliminated, i.e. this process can be described as an enlargement of polling stations; such optimization reflects demographic processes, but may raise the issue of physical accessibility of polling stations.
- Only minimal information is available to the public, both about the opportunities for nomination to the territorial election commissions and about the meetings of the bodies forming the commissions, as well as their results: the process of holding meetings remained non-transparent and non-competitive. The lists of names of members of the commissions have still not been published.
- The five largest public associations (BRSM, Belaya Rus, Union of Women, Union of Veterans, Fund for Peace), four of which have legislatively established special relations with the state since 2023, and the trade unions, which are members of the FPB, remain the main source of the clerks, ensuring the conduct of elections* at the level of TECs and PECs (in addition to four political parties remaining after re-registration, all of which support the course of the current government). The percentage of "pass rate" of candidates from these pro-government parties and public associations imitating civil society, which together make up 63% of the composition of all TECs, tended to 100%; in PECs, representatives of citizens occupied 29.1% of seats; representatives of 4 political parties — 9.8%; representatives of public associations — 49.4%; representatives of labor collectives — 11.7%.
- The special role of pro-government trade unions is noticeable; they won 15.7% of the seats in the PECs, which confirms the role of trade unions as one of the main sources of "workers" for violating electoral legislation and at the same time creating a picture of the democratic process.
- The behavior of political parties looked unnatural: the leaders of 3 of the 4 remaining parties in Belarus were registered as presidential candidates, and it would be logical to see an active willingness to fill in the PECs with their representatives, but these 3 parties collectively nominated only 4.3% of the total number of nominated representatives. Such indicators emphasize the imitative nature of the participation of political parties and their leaders in these elections*; their main role is to ensure the legitimization of the procedure through the creation of an image of democracy and having an alternative.
- In the situation of a total purge of civic activity, the declared grassroots activity of citizens who allegedly nominated more than 16,500 representatives to the PECs and collected signatures of at least 10 people in support of each nomination is particularly questionable.
- Thus, given the climate of general intimidation, the lack of effective information dissemination, and extremely short deadlines, it can be stated that active citizens actually had no opportunity to nominate their representatives to the TECs and PECs. The purpose of the election commission formation stage was rather the opposite: to conduct it as quickly and quietly as possible.
- A gender imbalance has persisted: the share of women (74.8%) in PECs is significantly higher than the share of men.
- For the third election campaign, the legislation allows not to publish the name lists of PECs members. This makes it much more difficult to assess the specifics of PECs' composition, in particular, the extent to which the commonly noted "occupational principle" of forming election commissions is preserved, when commission members represent different entities (parties, citizens, public associations), but are recruited from the same organization and the workers' immediate superiors are the supervisors of these election commissions.
Nomination and registration of candidates
- There remains a repressive climate of threat, fear-mongering, pressure, and persecution in connection with any civic activity unauthorized by the state. "Preventive conversations" and repeated detentions of people who were active during the previous presidential campaign in 2020 are combined with a demonstration of readiness to harshly suppress any manifestations of disloyalty in this election campaign. This climate of fear negatively affects the chances of "healthy" voter behavior — knowing the repressive consequences of putting signatures in support of candidates other than Aliaksandr Lukashenka in 2020, voters do not want to take the risk of signing in support of anyone in 2024.
- Applications for registration of initiative groups for the nomination of presidential candidates were submitted by 11 people (55 in 2020). The Central Election Commission (CEC) refused to register the initiative groups of Dziyana Kavaliova (due to the insufficient number of members of the initiative group), Aliaksandr Drazdou, and Viktar Kulesh (due to non-compliance with the requirements for the list of members of the initiative group), Yury Hubarevich (due to sending documents by e-mail, which is not explicitly allowed by electoral legislation).
- The CEC has registered 7 initiative groups nominating presidential candidates — Aliaksandr Lukashenka (sitting president), Aleh Haidukevich (chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus), Aliaksandr Khizhniak (chairman of the Republican Party of Labor and Justice), Volha Chamadanava (head of the main department of Ideological Work and Youth Affairs of the Minsk City Executive Committee), Hanna Kanapatskaya (individual entrepreneur), Siarhei Bobrykau (chairman of the Republican Council of the public association Belarusian Union of Officers), Siarhei Syrankou (first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus). Later it was announced that V. Chamadanava and S. Bobrykau filed applications for the termination of the work of their initiative groups. None of these candidates came forward as a clear alternative to A. Lukashenka. Rather, they have been planned to act as "sparring partners" who should provide a formal alternative in the ballot.
- The preservation in the legislation of the permission to collect signatures on the territories of enterprises and institutions has strengthened the mechanism of administrative coercion to sign in support of A. Lukashenka and, in some cases, A. Khizhniak and probably other "sparring partners". Signature collectors often did not present documents; information for signature lists was provided by the personnel departments of state institutions and state-owned enterprises.
- The collection of signatures took place with serious violations of the standards of free and democratic elections, in a climate of intimidation and coercion. De facto authorities took active measures to prevent any potential civil activity unauthorized by the state. The process of collecting signatures excluded equality of candidates and was aimed at creating a picture of support for only one candidate, A. Lukashenka, with the traditional use of administrative resources and forcing voters to sign in support of his nomination as a candidate. This stage is the most transparent for the executive vertical, when all the signatures and the refusal to sign may become grounds for politically motivated prosecution.
- TECs confirmed the collection of the required 100,000 signatures by all five candidates. As before, signature verification took place in an opaque manner and in a very short time, which raises reasonable doubts about the figures' validity.
- Part of a de facto campaigning designed to legitimize the idea of broad voter support for A. Lukashenka is a record-high number of declared signatures and the difference between the allegedly collected signatures in his support (more than 2.5 million signatures, about 35% of all voters) and signatures collected by other candidates (in the range of 112–134 thousand). A special role was assigned to state and pro-government media resources, especially regional newspapers, which essentially focused on campaigning for A. Lukashenka.
- The CEC registered candidates and issued registration certificates to 5 nominees: Aleh Haidukevich, Hanna Kanapatskaya, Aliaksandr Lukashenka, Siarhei Syrankou, Aliaksandr Khizhniak on the very next day after the start of the registration stage, i. e. this is the fastest registration in the history of presidential elections.
Campaigning
- As part of this phase, there should have been a political race between the presidential candidates, but in a situation of simulated competition (most candidates did not position themselves as a real alternative to A. Lukashenka, but rather campaigned for him, which is well reflected in the statement of S. Syrankou: "Not against, but together"), the actions of all candidates, except for A. Lukashenka, who used the administrative resource, were almost invisible to a wide audience.
- The requirements of the electoral legislation to ensure the publication of election programs and the provision of airtime on state radio and television were fulfilled, but it is impossible to speak of equality of candidates in the use of the media; formally, televised debates were held (A. Lukashenka, as always, refused to participate in them). Some speeches of the candidates (A. Haidukevich, S. Syrankou) contained signs of inciting hatred, prohibited by Article 47 of the Electoral Code.
- The election campaigning took place in unequal conditions: the administrative and propaganda resources of the power vertical, pro-government public organizations, and state media were involved in support of A. Lukashenka. We can identify several mechanisms of such abuse: 1) using the administrative and information capabilities attached to the office of the president as part of campaigning by A. Lukashenka; 2) actions within the framework of the Marathon of Unity and the promotion of the slogan "Time has chosen us!"; 3) Needs to Be Done! campaign (flash mob); 4) information about the elections in general, used for covert campaigning in favor of A. Lukashenka; 5) meetings of A. Lukashenka's proxies, many of whom are officials, with representatives of labor collectives of state-owned enterprises and institutions, including during working hours.
- The deliberately blurred line between fulfilling government duties and campaigning allowed A. Lukashenka to combine official visits, meetings, and trips with actual campaigning, using the privileges of extensive information services provided to an office of a president at public expense; the decision to raise pensions by A. Lukashenka, in his official capacity as president, during elections can be considered as vote-buying and is a form of abuse of state resources.
- The Marathon of Unity, a large-scale propaganda campaign that lasted for 4 months, was funded by the state (the estimated expenses are more than 3.5 million rubles [more than 1 million euros]) and was essentially the election campaign of A. Lukashenka. The slogan of the election campaign of A. Lukashenka: "Time has chosen us!" was promoted through the ABPA, the Marathon of Unity, the daily "historical" TV project Time Has Chosen Us! on the Belarus 1 TV channel.
- Imitation of political activity and broad support, as well as additional resources for campaigning, were received by A. Lukashenka thanks for the Needs to Be Done! flash mob, which was presented as a spontaneous campaign of support for A. Lukashenka, but had signs of an organized event, moreover, an event where people were forced to participate.
- Just as in the 2024 elections*, educational and awareness-raising events about the elections have replaced the genuine political process. But even in such "general" words about the importance of elections and the obligation of voters to participate in elections (with a continuing focus on early voting), there is room for indirect campaigning for A. Lukashenka (statements about the correctness of the "chosen course" and the need to support the "national leader").
- In the absence of independent observers and sufficient transparency in the process of inflows and expenditures in the electoral funds of candidates, it is impossible to carry out full-fledged monitoring of the financial side of the elections. At the same time, the officially declared expenses of all candidates (including A. Lukashenka) are significantly below the established limit of 420,000 rubles [122,389 euros]. Even the amount spent from the fund of A. Lukashenka (105,588.87 rubles [30,769 euros]) is clearly not enough to launch a full-fledged campaign across the country.
Voting and its results
- After the widely disputed results of the previous presidential election, it was important for A. Lukashenka to show the support of voters and thereby legitimize his hold on power. In the tradition of an authoritarian state, turnout is seen as evidence of legitimization on a par with the votes cast. Probably, an important task of demonstrating that a "corner has been turned", i.e. maintaining control over the country, is to show both a bigger turnout and results than in the 2020 elections.
- The authorities made efforts to organize a real turnout (using administrative pressure), but the information picture of mass voter activity was even more intensively organized (information events around the elections* and their media coverage actively created a "festive mood" and mass support for A. Lukashenka.)
- As in previous election campaigns, early voting was of an administrative, mobilization, and compulsory nature and was conducted for reporting purposes. Despite the fact that the Electoral Code defines early voting as an extraordinary measure that should be used when a voter is unable to vote on the main day, the authorities urged and forced early voting; the official voter turnout for early voting was a record 41.81% (48.8% of all those who voted).
- The elections*2025 were held in conditions of an increased and obviously excessive presence of law enforcement agencies: several police officers were present at all polling stations, video surveillance and "panic buttons" for commission members were installed, the stations were equipped with open booths allowing to monitor what is happening in them.
- The main violation of electoral legislation, which was actively warned about by everyone involved in the information service of the election campaign, and the facts that are being actively voiced, is photographing the ballot (it was photographing ballots in 2020 that allowed the facts of mass falsification of election results to be revealed).
- The preliminary results of voting across the country were announced by the CEC 6 hours after the polling stations closed.
- The vote count was still opaque, and data on polling stations had not been published.
- Despite the alleged great openness of the CEC and the availability of information on the elections on its website and prompt dissemination of information in the Telegram channel, no data is provided by the CEC in machine-readable form (all tables are given as .pdf files); the CEC modifies many of the data without indicating that they have been corrected.
*For this statement and other documents of the "Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections" campaign, the term "elections*" in relation to the 2025 election campaign is used with an asterisk to emphasize the perfunctory nature of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes, first of all, conditions where rights and freedoms are fully realized, including freedom of speech, freedom of peaceful assembly and association, the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, freedom from discrimination, which is currently practically absent in Belarus.
