The Belarusian Helsinki Committee (BHC) has published the report “Belarus and the UPR: A Comparison of the 2020 and 2025 Cycles,” which compares the recommendations received by Belarus during the third and fourth cycles of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), as well as the Belarusian authorities’ response to them. In 2025, Belarus received a record 332 recommendations from 101 delegations, exactly half of which — 166 — were not supported by the authorities.
Who is this report for? We expect the report to be useful to States preparing recommendations for Belarus in future UPR cycles, as the analysis shows which formulations the authorities tend to support and which they consistently reject. It is also a tool for human rights organisations and initiatives working on alternative reports and advocacy: the study identifies issues that have so far remained outside the UPR agenda but require the attention of the international community. Finally, the report may be useful to journalists and researchers seeking a structured overview of how the human rights situation in Belarus has — and has not — changed over the past five years.
Key findings:
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The conclusion of the third cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (2020–2025) and the beginning of the fourth (2025–2030) took place amid a significant decline in the State’s cooperation with international human rights mechanisms. As a result, the UPR has become particularly important as one of the few universal forums in which Belarus continues to participate in international dialogue on human rights.
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The number of recommendations made to Belarus has increased from cycle to cycle: 93 (2010) → 257 (2015) → 266 (2020) → 332 (2025). The fourth cycle also saw a record number of delegations participating in the dialogue — 101.
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Many key concerns recur in the 2020 and 2025 recommendations, including cooperation with international mechanisms, freedom of expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, judicial independence, prevention of torture, abolition of the death penalty, the establishment of a national human rights institution, and accession to international treaties. The recurrence of these recommendations points not only to a lack of progress but, in many cases, to a further deterioration of the human rights situation.
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The 2025 cycle saw, for the first time on such a scale, recommendations concerning the rights of LGBTQ+ people, the instrumentalisation of migrants, Belarus’ involvement in the war against Ukraine, a return to international commitments from which the country withdrew after 2020, and accountability for human rights violations.
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At the same time, a number of issues actively raised by civil society in preparation for the review did not make it into the final recommendations. These include environmental and climate rights, cultural rights, the ideologisation and militarisation of education, the criminalisation of activities carried out on behalf of unregistered organisations, the dissolution of political parties, and issues related to political pluralism. The BHC believes that these issues should receive additional attention in preparations for the next UPR cycle.
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The authorities did not support half of the recommendations made during the fourth cycle — 166 out of 332.
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The basic logic of the authorities’ engagement with the UPR is as follows: recommendations framed as “obligations of conduct” (“continue efforts,” “consider”) are generally supported, while recommendations framed as “obligations of result” — requiring specific legislative, institutional, or policy changes — are not supported. Recommendations whose wording itself identifies a violation by Belarus are also not supported.
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Belarus’ response changed noticeably in 2025: instead of stating that recommendations had already been implemented, the authorities more frequently used the category “accepted for implementation.” However, this change appears to be largely technical and does not indicate greater openness to reform.
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The BHC’s analysis shows that Belarus’ response is influenced not only by the substance of a recommendation but also by the political context of its relations with the recommending State. Recommendations from States that maintain close relations with Belarus are more likely to be supported, while recommendations from democratic States are often not supported even when they are substantively the same as recommendations from other countries that Belarus has already supported.
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Overall, the results of the fourth UPR cycle indicate that Belarus’ participation in the mechanism is becoming increasingly formalistic. Despite its continued engagement with the review process and its support for a significant proportion of the recommendations, the State predominantly supports recommendations of a general nature while consistently declining to support proposals that require specific reforms, independent oversight, or greater accountability.
Full report (The report is currently available in Russian only. An English version is planned in the near future)
Background: The Belarusian Helsinki Committee has worked consistently with the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism on Belarus for many years. Under the BHC’s overall coordination, a coalition of Belarusian human rights organisations prepared joint UPR reports in 2020, 2023 and 2025.