The overview of human rights trends for September–December 2025 has been published, together with a short annual presentation summarising the situation for the whole of 2025 (available in Russian only).
About the Review of Trends
This review will highlight the substantive changes in Belarusian public policy in the field of human rights and reactions to it of the international community in three areas:
- general measures: systemic things — legislation, strategies, policies, that generally determine the conditions and background for the implementation of human rights in Belarus;
- law enforcement practice: concrete violations of civil and political rights, as well as in the field of social, economic, and cultural rights;
- key decisions and reactions of international institutions regarding the situation with human rights in Belarus.
Our analytics is for a better understanding of the trends and situation with human rights in Belarus and for the possibility of monitoring systemic and essential changes, as well as for expanding the human rights focus in related expert spheres (economic, political, social, etc.). It also can be used for justification of positions, opinions, policies, and strategies.
Explore all the trends at trends.belhelcom.org.
Summary
→ Since 2023, we have observed a growing trend of repressive pressure on individuals based on the mere existence of a legal link with a foreign state (foreign citizenship or a residence permit), and the gradual crystallisation of this factor into an independent ground for discrimination. At the end of 2025, this trend found yet another expression.
First, a draft law (currently at the proposal stage) seeks to expand the categories of Belarusian citizens subject to mandatory fingerprint registration. These would include: (a) Belarusian citizens residing in Belarus who hold another citizenship or a residence permit in a foreign state; and (b) Belarusian citizens permanently residing outside the Republic of Belarus who have registered with consular authorities and formalised permanent residence abroad.
By analogy with the so-called “passport decree”, it can be assumed that this measure is primarily aimed at Belarusians who have left the country for political reasons. However, as in the case of the passport decree, the measure will also inevitably affect all Belarusian citizens permanently residing abroad or holding a foreign residence permit, regardless of the reasons for their departure.
Second, the same draft law proposes to expand the scope of personal data transmitted to the state in connection with border crossings. In addition to data already provided by air and rail carriers, the draft would require the transfer of passenger data from road transport operators. This provision likewise raises concerns regarding arbitrary collection and storage of personal data and, more broadly, the expansion of surveillance over all those travelling to Western countries. Taken together with other factors (including trends in border checks), it appears likely that particular attention is being paid to individuals travelling to the main destination countries of political emigration — Poland and Lithuania — whose borders with Belarus can currently be crossed only by road transport. At the same time, the measure will in practice affect everyone crossing the border in this manner. It thus illustrates another step towards a Soviet-style “Iron Curtain” and a further turn in the direction of totalitarianism.
→ The proposed changes relating to mandatory fingerprinting also exemplify the broader trajectory towards isolationism and the consolidation of a general anti-Western trend that has accompanied the policies of the Belarusian regime since 2020, including in its treatment of foreign nationals. The range of foreign citizens subject to mandatory fingerprint registration is being significantly expanded. Among others, it now includes individuals in respect of whom border control authorities decide that fingerprinting is required in the interests of national security. Border guards are thus vested with direct powers to conduct fingerprinting.
→ Formal powers of law enforcement agencies to restrict access to internet resources, telecommunications services, and internet services for both legal entities and individuals without judicial oversight have also been expanded. In practical terms, authorities are now empowered to block websites and disconnect individuals or organisations from internet and mobile communication services whenever they consider that there is “information indicating an identified violation of the law, as well as causes and conditions conducive to the commission of a crime”.
→ The list of professions access to which is conditioned on formal loyalty requirements continues to expand. In addition to professions already subject to such restrictions — tour guides and interpreter-guides (2023–2024), notaries and educators (2024), as well as real estate agents, insolvency administrators, and auditors (May–August 2025) — further categories of banking personnel were added between September and December 2025. These include “key officials and specialists of banks”, such as senior managers and their deputies, those responsible for risk management, internal control and audit, as well as other individuals occupying, or applying for, these positions.
→ The authorities have further formalised and tightened the accreditation requirements for legal entities conducting public opinion polls. A single consolidated regulatory instrument has been introduced, replacing several previously fragmented documents. Among other things, it establishes additional accreditation criteria, including the requirement that neither the owners of the property of the legal entity applying for accreditation, nor its participants or senior management, appear on lists of organisations or individuals — including individual entrepreneurs — deemed to be involved in terrorist or extremist activities.
→ The functions of the armed forces and the grounds for the introduction of martial law have been expanded. First, the tasks of the armed forces in peacetime now explicitly include participation in preventing the outbreak of an internal armed conflict and, should such a conflict arise, in its resolution. Second, the grounds for declaring martial law set out in the Law “On Martial Law” have been brought into line with the new Military Doctrine adopted in 2024, which significantly broadened the list of perceived military threats. As a result, a number of the grounds for the introduction of martial law now allow for arbitrary interpretation and application, particularly given that the definition of an “internal armed conflict” contained in the Military Doctrine does not correspond to the definition under international humanitarian law.
→ Measures targeting “economically inactive individuals” have been tightened once again. Increased tariffs for housing and communal services are now applied to the entire volume of such services in apartments owned by these individuals, even where working individuals reside in the same premises (whereas previously increased tariffs applied only to such persons’ share). This measure may also be viewed, indirectly, as a form of “punishment” of those who have left the country, or at least as the creation of additional obstacles for them. In this case, it additionally introduces an element of “collective responsibility” for those living with them or residing in their apartments. As a result, the measure places not only “economically inactive individuals” themselves, but also their relatives and close associates living with them, in an unequal position.
→ Among the new practices identified in the period from September to December 2025, the most significant are: the forcible transfer of political prisoners released from detention to the territory of a state engaged in armed conflict (Ukraine); continuing repression against forcibly transferred individuals, including as a result of their legally uncertain status; and a further tightening of unlawful practices targeting so-called “social parasites”.
→ In connection with the expiry of statutes of limitation for a number of “political” offences, the authorities have taken various steps, including some that are formally lawful, such as releasing individuals from criminal liability under Article 342 of the Criminal Code and reclassifying the offence as an administrative one. However, these measures cannot be regarded as a positive trend. In parallel, in order to suspend the running of limitation periods, many individuals were placed on wanted lists, and those whose charges were reclassified were nevertheless included in “extremist” lists. These fragmented and inconsistent actions are most likely attributable to the non-linearity of the system, the absence of strategic planning even within repressive policy, resource constraints, and a significant degree of subjective decision-making.
